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Zheng Wang. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in
Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
Reviewed by Constance Wilkinson

“Never Forget National Humiliation!”? Really? Yes. This is Zheng Wang’s very
interesting study of the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party’s massive re-education
campaign. It was created in the years following the Tiananmen Square Massacre of
1989 when post-Mao CCP hard-liners approved a military response to civilian
protesters that would crush China’s emerging pro-democracy movement.
Zheng Wang points out that Tiananmen is one of many events “that have been formally
ignored by the Chinese government…Beijing has even gone so far as to ban the mere
discussion of specific events it would choose to forget.” (p.6)
Zheng Wang’s book describes “how the legitimacy-challenged Chinese Communist
Party has used history education as an instrument for the glorification of the party, for
the consolidation of national identity, and for the justification of the political system of
the CCP’s one-party rule in the post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War eras.” (p.9)
On the face of it, it seems peculiar to recommend that Chinese patriots keep national
humiliation in mind, like pouring fresh salt into old wounds, wounds inflicted by certain
historic events. “Never forget!” is one thing; “continually marinate in victimization” is
quite another.
Yet, as Zheng Wang informs us, that is indeed a patriot’s duty according to the CCP’s
Patriotic Education Campaign platform of 1991. It is the duty of patriots to focus on
China’s miserable foreign-devil-victimized past, thus, to become more motivated to
work harder and harder to re-gain the stolen glory of China. Thus, the new CCP party
line: “Never forget national humiliation!” Really. Seriously. Never get over it.
As Zheng Wang reminds us, even Republic of China Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
never got over it (p.80). For decades, Zheng Wang tells us, Chiang Kai-Shek wrote in
his daily diary just such an exhortation: “Xuechi!” (“Avenge humiliation! Wipe clean
humiliation!”) (p.81). The post-Mao post-Tiananmen CCP is happy to take this ball
and run with it, to create an official state narrative of victimization, humiliation, and
blame. In this book, Professor Zheng Wang tells us why and how they did so. (p.191)
In Chapter 1, “Historical Memory, Identity, and Politics,” the author presents prior
studies relevant to understanding the “function of historical memory in group identity
formation and how historical memory influences people’s perceptions, interpretations,
and decision-making processes, especially in a conflict or crisis situation” (p.19).
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Wang presents two frameworks for empirical research. The first seeks to measure
collective identity and the second seeks to analyze the effect of historical memory on
beliefs. This chapter sets the stage for what follows.
In Chapter 2, “Chosen Glory, Chosen Trauma,” Zheng Wang discusses how China’s
past experiences have worked to shape China’s national identity — its sense of self. He
makes use of Norwegian sociologist and peace-theoretician Johan Galtung’s
Chosenness-Myth-Trauma lens. Three cultural dimensions comprise the: “ChosennessMyth-Trauma-Complex”1 (p.41). It is worth noting that Galtung’s C-M-T complex is
not a neutral concept, but one that reveals civilizational psychopathology. The
chosenness-myth-trauma complex can be regarded as “the collective megalo-paranoia
syndrome.”2
Wang applies Galtung’s C-M-T lens to China as follows: China’s Chosen Chosenness:
an attitude of inherent superiority. Since ancient times, China is and always has
regarded itself as special; that is, they are “chosen” because they live in tianxia, AllUnder-Heaven, the Middle Kingdom, the center of the entire world. (p.42) (As Galtung
points out elsewhere, “Chosen-ness induces collective sentiments of grandeur relative
to all others.”3)
China’s Chosen Myth: that it possesses limitless virtue and good qualities. Since
ancient times, China self-perception is that it is very embodiment of civilization and
good qualities. Peace-loving, benevolent, better than anyone else and everyone else
(p.43) (p.125). “China is4 the world, not just ‘a country in the world’ (p.71). This is
reflected in Zheng Wang’s mention of a Chinese official’s officious letter to Queen
Victoria, in which he condescendingly scolds her, saying she must check her “barbarian
merchants” and “show further the sincerity of your politeness and submissiveness”
toward China (p.39).
Chosen Trauma: China’s trauma is not due to its own errors but is due to having been
victimized by other, lesser nations (p.68). Since “until 1840, China considered
itself…the only true civilization, (p.68) its tianxia view made China “unable to
acknowledge an international world of formally equal states.”

1
“Chosenness, the idea of being a people chosen by transcendental forces, above all others, endowed,
even anointed, to be a light unto others, with the right and even the duty to govern them; trauma, of
being a people hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, intent
on hitting again; myths of a glorious past, near or distant, to be recreated.” Galtung, J. Are There
Therapies for Bad Cosmologies?” Medicine and War, Vol. II, p. 172
2
” Galtung, p. 172
3
” Galtung, p. 172
4
Emphasis mine.
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By the time of the First Opium War and lasting over the next century, China’s mythic
tianxia ego began to deflate. At the start, China had been, in her own eyes, the natural
ruler of the universe. However, over time, it became shockingly clear that ignorant
Western barbarian nations were oblivious to this eternal truth. Even worse, the “dwarf
pirate” (p.81) people of Japan, once China’s vassal, had ceased to remain submissive.
Continuing throughout “the century of humiliation” (p.47), China’s glory repeatedly
was besmirched by experiences of weakness and defeat at the hands of foreign-devil
Western powers and by foreign devil Japan. All these states disrespected China and
humiliated China with their bullying, unequal treaties and their victorious armies, such
that “with each new humiliation, the Chinese lost a little bit of their national myth of
greatness,” (p.68) inflicting painful, narcissistic wounds.
Absent a century of humiliation of glorious China by mean foreign bully nations, there
would have been no need for reform in China, and no need for revolution(s) (p.68).
Civil war and bloody revolutions in China were the fault of mean, greedy, bloody
barbarian non-Chinese foreign nations’ actions, while China remains glorious by means
of its blamelessness.
Chapter 3, “From ‘All-Under-Heaven’ to a Nation-State: National Humiliation and
Nation Building” concerns the Chinese Communist Party’s nation-building challenge:
how to construct a new national identity suitable to modern times, and suitable to taking
its place on the international stage. However, China’s mythic stance of inherent
superiority “made it difficult for China to adapt psychologically to the new reality of
international affairs. China was not prepared to join the family of nations as an equal
member” — because how could it be equal when it was in fact superior? (p.73)
Thus began China’s process of adjusting its self-identity, painfully proceeding through
the periods of the late Qing, the Republic, the initial Chinese Communist Party, the
Maoist Chinese Communist Party, the post-Maoist Chinese Communist Party, and the
Post-Tiananmen Square Massacre Chinese Communist Party, the latter still in power
today.
Chapter 4, “From Victim to Victor: The Patriotic Education Campaign,” shows why
and how the Post-Tiananmen Square Massacre Chinese Communist Party rewrote the
Chinese national narrative. Having crushed the grassroots Chinese pro-democracy
movement in 1989, the post-Tiananmen Massacre CCP worked on how best to regain
its authoritarian power, eliminate the threat of democracy in China, and retain the
Party’s iron grip on power in China. Perhaps frightened by the threat of democracy and
even civil war, the Post-Massacre CCP created an inescapable propaganda framework
built on a pro-CCP, anti-democracy, anti-western frame, one that historian James
Harrison called “the most massive attempt at ideological re-education in human
history.” (p.96)
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The Post-Tiananmen Chinese Communist Party devoted years to crafting and carrying
out this re-education campaign to burnish its image and gain legitimacy and popular
sympathy and (of course) more political power under the frame of “making our
motherland strong, the people prosperous, and the nation immensely rejuvenated.”
(p.133)
Zheng Wang demonstrates that the ideological re-education goals outlined in 1994 were
specific:
to boost the nation’s spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self-esteem and pride,
consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and
direct and rally the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building
socialism with Chinese characteristics. (p.99)
It was also, as Zheng Wang quotes William Callahan, “an effort to re-direct young
people’s anger away from the party.” (p.100). Younger individuals “had to be
reintroduced to the imperialist past, to re-experience its bitterness and shame” (p.100)
while magically making memory of a massacre disappear.
Chapter 5, “From Vanguard to Patriot: Reconstructing the Chinese Communist Party,”
explains how the post-Tiananmen CCP used the theme of national humiliation to
achieve the political ends previously mentioned and create social cohesion. Wang
reminds us that “the more we identify with our group, the more we will differentiate
our group from other groups.” (p.125)
This process is exemplified by the work of post-TSM CCP master propagandist
patriotic re-branding revisionist re-educator Jiang Zemin, who ran with that ball,
dividing people “into two categories: the ‘ardent patriots’ and the ‘scum of the nation.’”
One can’t get more binary than that, can one? (p.125). Patriotic citizens “should hate
the foreign invaders, despise traitors, and respect patriots.” (p.125). Everyone must
study and keep in mind national humiliation. Chinese leaders who followed Jiang, Hu
Jintao, and Wen Jiabao among them, were happy to keep that Neo-Foreign Devil reframe going, utilizing “China’s past history of humiliation to awaken the people’s
historical consciousness and build cohesion.” (p.140)
In 1995, 100 sites were identified as demonstration bases for national patriotic
education (p.105). Forty sites are dedicated to external wars (battlefields, museums,
memorials), that is, military conflicts with Japan, Russian, India, the Netherlands, the
Boxer Uprising’s eight ally nations, and so on. Twenty-four sites commemorate the
1927-1949 KMT-CCP Chinese civil war. Twenty-one sites are dedicated to myths of
glory: wonders of architecture and ancient civilization (15 sites); prehistoric sites (4);
achievements after 1949 (2 sites). Fifteen sites are dedicated to heroes: CCP leaders,
model workers, patriots.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol87/iss87/13
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More than 350 million visitors have flocked to these patriotic education bases since the
re-education campaign began. Supported by the government, these sites receive “a
large number of organized visits from schools, army groups, and government agencies.”
(p.106). Visitors to the “Memorial Hall for Compatriots Killed in the Nanjing Massacre
by Japanese Forces of Aggression” will see a huge stone wall at the entrance with the
death toll inscribed as ‘Victims: 300,000.’” (p.58). The Japanese attack on Shenyang
is memorialized by the September 18th Historical Museum . . . built (in 1991) on the
exact site where the attack occurred in 1931.” (p.56) The Museum features a large
bronze bell engraved with four characters meaning “Never Forget National
Humiliation.” (p.56)
Chapter 6, “From Earthquake to Olympics: New Trauma, New Glory” analyzes China’s
behavior during two world events in terms of historical memory as used by the postTiananmen Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party co-opted hosting
the Olympics to inflate its appreciation of itself, to harvest glorious success on the world
stage, and to trumpet it in all directions. Each gold medal won by China helped to
accrue more glory (although, sadly, anything less than gold equaled humiliation and
defeat).
Wang next recounts China’s response to a disastrous earthquake, and how the state
propaganda media coverage was used as way to accrue glory for China, as it provided
an opportunity to show China’s people and show the world their bravery, fearlessness,
and ability to conquer adversity.
Chapter 7, “Memory, Crises, and Foreign Relations” applies the Chosenness-MythTrauma Complex to explain China’s behavioral response to crises happening on the
world stage. To me, most interesting among them was his discussion of the NATO-US
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.
Zheng Wang cites notes of discussions from the CCP elite in which their anger is based
on feeling insulted. The US apologized repeatedly, framing the incident as due to a
technical error in targeting. The Chinese were so furious that the CCP government itself
incited violent student demonstrations to threaten US Embassies, the first large
demonstrations to occur since the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. It was a notable
over-reaction, not unlike the great re-education campaign.
Chapter 8 is entitled “Memory, Textbooks, and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation” and
concerns just that, presenting a perspective of reconciliation and peacebuilding through
the joint writing/re-writing of history. Chapter 9, on “Memory, History, and China’s
Rise,” reviews the main points of the book, and “how the lenses of history and memory
facilitate a better understanding of China’s rise, intentions, and nationalism.” (p.15)
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Zheng Wang’s book inspired in this reader renewed curiosity about and appreciation of
Chinese history, ancient and modern. Through his analysis, I discovered the modular
nature of modern Chinese history. Deletions. Insertions. Historic events swapped IN
and OUT like LEGOs—red for green; green for blue; sometimes back to red again,
according to propaganda needs of the era.
Thus, for Chiang Kai-Shek:
“Never Forget National Humiliation!” narrative? IN!
“Foreign Devils, Bad Treaties!” frame? IN!
“Rape of Nanking” memory IN!
Nationalism? IN!
While, for Mao:
“Rape of Nanking”? OUT! (Delete because it reminds minds of KMT’s military
victory).
Humiliation narrative? OUT! (Blame class enemies.)
Chinese Nationalism? OUT! (Too Chiang Kai-Shek-y.)
International Communist internationalism? IN!
Great Famine Due to CCP Incompetence? DELETE.
Genocidal Imperialist Aggression Toward Tibet? DELETE.
For Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party:
Damage Done by the Great Leap Forward? DELETE.
Social Trauma Due to Cultural Revolution? DELETE.
CCP Fears Losing Mandate-of-Heaven Legitimacy? NOPE. DON’T MENTION IT.
Rising Calls for Democracy? SUPPRESS. DENY.
Then, Tiananmen.
Tiananmen Square Massacre? DELETE. DENY.
Never Forget National Humiliation? INSERT. LATHER, RINSE, REPEAT: NEW
ENEMY!
Zheng Wang analyzes China’s aggressive response to a spy plane incident in 2001,
saying the “collision between [a] Chinese fighter plane and [a] U.S. spy plane developed
into an unexpected clash of face and pride” (p.189). Although the US plane had been
flying over international waters, Chinese fighter planes attacked the US plane anyway,
after which expansionist China behaved as if China were the aggrieved party: “US Flies
Plane Over International Waters to Insult China!”
Why so touchy? Because, says Zheng Wang, “the legitimacy of China’s current rulers
is highly dependent upon successful performance on the international stage” (p.189).
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Likewise, CCP China’s reaction to the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade seems an over-reaction. Zheng Wang includes in his book detailed notes of a
heated discussion among CCP leaders: “A quick content analysis of those remarks
indicates that, of the seven top leaders, five of them used the term provocation and
insult, four of them regarded the bombing as bullying or used terms such as dignity or
humiliation, four of them directly called the bombing a plot or ploy.” Zheng Wang
notes China’s outsized response and he does include the possibility that the bombing
was not accidental. (p.176)5 This makes China’s angry response more understandable,
and its sense of having been insulted. It might be framed as “US Insults China by
Catching China’s Belgrade Embassy Red-Handed Forwarding Secret NATO Military
Targets Information, So US on Behalf of NATO Precision-Bombs China’s Embassy at
Night Removing Military Threat,” all the while mendaciously maintaining in public
that it was just an accident, so sorry. Humiliating indeed.
Zheng Wang’s book is inspiring and thought-provoking. It helps us to appreciate why
the post-Tiananmen Massacre CCP went to such lengths to turn popular attention away
from an annoying proto-democracy movement and toward inflammatory nationbuilding, set on a propaganda foundation whereby rejuvenating China means regaining
its status as the center of the world. Its spin is anti-western-nations, anti-Japan, antidemocracy. It revives the myth of Chinese Supremacy. It encourages a pervasive
contempt for all other cultures while blaming all those lesser cultures for China’s
inferiority complex. Never forget national humiliation, after all. Keep those grudges
simmering.
The author states:
The empirical core of this book is concentrated on decoding one of the most
misunderstood and least addressed elements in Chinese politics today — historical
memory. Without directly addressing Chinese nationalism, I have used historical
memory to explain the cultural and historical foundations of that nationalism.

5

Guardian article https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans. “NATO deliberately
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo after discovering it was being used
to transmit Yugoslav army communications. According to senior military and intelligence sources in
Europe and the US, the Chinese embassy was removed from a prohibited targets list after NATO
electronic intelligence (Elint) detected it sending army signals to Milosevic's forces. . .The Chinese
may have calculated that NATO would not dare strike its embassy, but the five-storey building was
emptied every night of personnel. Only three people died in the attack, two of whom were, reportedly,
not journalists - the official Chinese version - but intelligence officers.”
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As this analysis has indicated, an understanding of the politics of historical memory
is essential to comprehending the linkage between the top-down state nationalism
and popular social nationalism, the conditions and circumstances that ignite
nationalist movements, and the controversies between globalism and nationalism in
China. (p.236)
This book concentrates on the CCP’s rehabilitation of itself after Tiananmen; he details
this massive propaganda campaign to regain CCP power and glory, strip power from
dissidents, and inflame their populace with propaganda about who is the real enemy of
the people and who are the glorious patriots.
Marinating China’s populace in the miseries of their historical past seems an unhealthy
response to deep socio-political trauma. It is, in fact, introducing a kind of poisoned
truth as a subject for social worship. China’s classic practice of merrily re-writing
history-to-order is highlighted by this propaganda campaign: delete mention/memory
of certain inconvenient events (p.242) lest they diminish national self-esteem and
tarnish glory; insert/highlight alternative facts/memories more relevant to preserving
stability/control. By which I mean, retaining power.
This propaganda strategy has been effective; the post-TM CCP has indeed retained
political power and control over China. However, this strategy of wallowing in
woundedness can also be seen as unwise and morally unsound. It can be viewed not as
evidence of China’s strength, but of China’s weakness, its fragile state ego, lack of
insight, and lack of a social conscience. The Post-Mao, post-Tiananmen Massacre
Chinese Communist Party clings to power by propping up China’s sense of self,
inflating its ego, and nursing its narcissistic injuries by wallowing in them.
This is a very problematic pattern. A nation-state that can never accept blame for its
own actual errors, while consistently putting the blame on inferior foreign “others,” is
not a state headed toward healthy civilizational growth.
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